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CASE COMMENTS
tance to the Commissioner's drug testing order. 2 2 Despite this convolution,
the trial court judged that the plaintiffs were discharged simply for their
refusal to undergo testing, not because of their suspected drug use.
Although the Third Circuit stopped short of overturning this finding, it
was skeptical of the trial court's conclusion. 23 The broad drug use alle-
gations undeniably obscured the purported focus on a single case of
employee disobedience, regardless of whether the court explicitly acknowl-
edged this fact. Tucker, in fact, can be read to fit neatly within Linton's
exception for pretextual charges.
Where, as in Linton, the generic allegations are "no more than
harmless surplusage," Loudermill and Tucker should not be read to require
a detailed accounting of these unrelated and really irrelevant charges.
Linton simply defines some common sense boundaries to curb the due
process explosion triggered by Goldberg v. Kelly2 4. and its progeny.
25
Linton confirms that Loudermill due process requires nothing more of a
state employer than clearly explained grievances justifying an employee's
termination and the opportunity for response to those charges. 20
F. CORPORATIONS
Perpetual Real Estate v. Michaelson Properties
974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1992)
One of the advantages of doing business as a corporation is that it
provides limited liability for shareholders. Courts recognize the corporation
202. See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989)
(discussing relationship between drug use allegations and urinalysis order).
203. See id. (questioning whether Commissioner would have discharged plaintiffs for resis-
tance to testing even if he were otherwise satisfied that they were not guilty of on-duty drug
use).
204. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (recognizing welfare as property right and requiring formal hearing
before government's termination of welfare benefits).
205. See generally Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (recognizing professor's de facto
tenure as giving rise to claim of entitlement protected by Due Process Clause); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (finding property interest in public education and requiring presuspension
hearing for students); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding
informal procedures insufficient to deny medicare claims of any amount). But see generally
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that lack of hearing preceding school
administrator's application of corporal punishment does not violate Fourteenth Amendment);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that government need not offer formal
adjudicatory hearing before terminating social security benefits); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976) (recognizing that state employee terminable at will has no property interest protected by
Fourteenth Amendment).
206. Linton v. Frederick County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 964 F.2d 1436, 1441 (4th Cir.
1992); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that
due process for public employees is satisfied by notice of charges, explanation of evidence, and
opportunity to respond).
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as an entity separate and distinct from its officers and shareholders,
describing the distinction as a "veil" between the corporation and the
shareholders. 20 7 Because of this veil, shareholders of a corporation are not
personally liable for the corporation's debts; their exposure to loss is
limited to their initial capital investment .20  Limited liability serves the
important goal of stimulating business investment.
20 9
Courts have been willing to depart from the principle of the corpo-
ration as a separate entity only under certain circumstances .210 Generally,
they will "pierce the corporate veil" and hold the owners liable if rec-
ognition of the corporate form would produce injustice or inequitable
consequences.21' Courts will exercise this power cautiously and reluctantly
as an extraordinary exception to the general rule of limited liability.212
The burden of proof rests on the party seeking to pierce the corporate
veil.
213
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held
that a court may disregard the corporate form when its recognition would
present an "element of injustice or fundamental unfairness. ' 214 The Fourth
Circuit has established a number of factors to evaluate in deciding whether
to pierce the corporate veil in its jurisdiction. They include undercapital-
ization, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends,
insolvency of the debtor corporation, siphoning of funds from the cor-
poration by the dominant shareholder, nonfunctioning of officers and
directors, absence of corporate records, and the use of the corporation as
a facade for the operations of the dominant shareholder. 215 A decision to
disregard the corporate entity may not rest on the existence of a single
factor but must involve a number of such factors. 2 6 While substantial
individual ownership of a corporation is a factor in deciding whether to
disregard the corporate entity, standing alone it is insufficient. 21 7 Proof of
207. See DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th
Cir. 1976) (discussing idea of corporation as separate entity).
208. See Cancun Adventure Tours v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F.2d 1044, 1047 (4th
Cir. 1988) (explaining doctrine of limited shareholder liability).
209. See Johnson v. Flower Indus., 814 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting underlying
purpose of limited liability).
210. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 683 (explaining rationale for piercing corporate
veil).
211. See id. (citing Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distilling & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973)).
212. Id.; see also Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply, 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987)
(explaining Virginia standard for piercing corporate veil); Beale v. Kappa Alpha Order, 64 S.E.2d
789, 797 (Va. 1951) (same).
213. DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir.
1976); Cheatle, 360 S.E.2d at 831.
214. DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 687.
215. See id. at 685-87; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820,
828 (4th Cir. 1992); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989).
216. DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 687.
217. Cancun Adventure Tours v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F.2d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir.
1988).
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fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil in the
Fourth Circuit. 2 8 Additionally, because the decision to pierce the corporate
veil is very fact dependent, the Fourth Circuit has held that it will regard
the district court's decision as presumptively correct and will overturn it
on appeal only if clearly erroneous.
21 9
Virginia state courts use a less elaborate, but more stringent, test for
piercing the corporate veil. To pierce the corporate veil in Virginia, the
plaintiff must show that the corporation was: 1) the alter ego, alias,
stooge, or dummy of the individual owners; and 2) was used by the owners
to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud, or conceal crime.? Like the Fourth
Circuit, Virginia courts may also be more willing to pierce the corporate
veil in the case of a closely held corporation. 221 Unlike the Fourth Circuit,
however, to become personally liable the owners must have used their
control to try to defraud or wrong a third party or conceal a crime;
fundamental unfairness is not enough. 222 As in the Fourth Circuit, a
reviewing court will regard the trial court's decision as presumptively
correct and will not overturn it on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
22
The Fourth Circuit examined the subtle but important distinction
between the federal and Virginia tests for piercing the corporate veil in
Perpetual Real Estate v. Michaelson Properties.224 In a diversity action
applying Virginia law, the plaintiff, Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc.
(PRES), sought to pierce the corporate veil of its former~business partner,
Michaelson Properties, Inc. (MPI), and hold Aaron Michaelson, MPI's
sole shareholder, personally liable for a breach of warranty claim against
the partnership.
Michaelson was the president and sole shareholder of MPI, a corpo-
ration he formed with an initial capitalization of $1,000 to enter into joint
218. See, e.g., Verreries De L'Hermitage, S.A. v. Hickory Furniture Co., 704 F.2d 140,
141 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that complainant seeking to pierce corporate veil need not prove
fraud or wrongdoing); Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1983)
(stating that court may pierce corporate veil in appropriate circumstances even in absence of
fraud or wrongdoing); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir.
1982) (stating that injustice or fundamental unfairness can exist in absence of fraud or wrong-
doing); DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1976)
(stating general rule that fraud is not necessary predicate for piercing corporate veil).
219. Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64-65.
220. See Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply, 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987); Lewis
Trucking Corp. v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 747, 753 (Va. 1966); Beale v. Kappa Alpha
Order, 64 S.E.2d 789, 798 (Va. 1951).
221. Compare DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 685 (stating that courts have shown no
hesitancy in disregarding corporate form when substantial individual corporate ownership is
combined with other factors) with Lewis Trucking, 147 S.E.2d at 753-54 (quoting treatise on
Michigan law for proposition that courts are more liberal in piercing corporate veil with one-
man corporation).
222. See Garrett v. Ancarrow Marine, Inc., 180 S.E.2d 668, 670 (Va. 1971) (refusing to
disregard corporate entity absent fraud); Washington & Old Dominion Users Ass'n v. Washington
& Old Dominion R.R., 155 S.E.2d 322, 326 (Va. 1967) (same).
223. Cheatle, 360 S.E.2d at 831.
224. 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1992).
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real estate ventures. MPI entered into two joint ventures with PRES to
convert apartment buildings in Maryland and Virginia into condominiums.
They formed the second partnership, Arlington Apartment Associates
(AAA), in November 1983. Under the AAA partnership agreement, PRES
and MPI each contributed $50,000 in capital and agreed to share the
partnership liabilities equally. To finance the project, the partnership
borrowed $24 million from Perpetual Savings Bank, PRES' parent cor-
poration, after Michaelson and his wife personally guaranteed $750,000
of the loan. PRES later loaned MPI $1.05 million to complete the project
after securing a second personal guarantee from the Michaelsons.
During 1985 and 1986 the AAA partnership made three distributions
of the profits from sales of the condominium units to MPI and PRES.
These distributions were made only after the partners had determined
there were sufficient partnership assets to meet expenses. MPI subsequently
distributed its share of the profits, totalling approximately $456,000, to
Michaelson as its sole shareholder. In 1987, more than a year after the
last of the distributions, several condominium purchasers sued AAA for
breach of warranty claims totaling $5.5 million. AAA settled out of court
for $950,000, with PRES paying the full amount on behalf of the part-
nership. MPI made no contribution to the settlement because it had already
distributed its profits to Michaelson.
PRES subsequently filed a diversity action against MPI and Michael-
son, seeking indemnity from MPI for the settlement and personal liability
from Michaelson for MPI's settlement debt. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered summary judgment on
the indemnity claim against MPI and denied Michaelson's motion for a
directed verdict on the veil piercing claim. The jury found Michaelson
personally liable for MPI's share of the settlement debt. Michaelson moved
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming the court had incor-
rectly instructed the jury on the applicable Virginia law for piercing the
corporate veil. 225 The district court denied the motion, deciding that the
instructions, which required the jury to find that Michaelson used MPI
to perpetrate an "injustice or fundamental unfairness" on PRES before
imposing personal liability, were the essential equivalent of the Virginia
requirement that the shareholder must use the corporate form to "disguise
a wrong" before the court pierces the corporate veil.
226
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. The Michaelson court deter-
mined the district court had incorrectly interpreted the Virginia standard
when it reviewed the jury instructions. In reviewing the applicable Virginia
case law, the court noted that the test articulated by the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply227 requires evi-
225. Perpetual Real Estate Serv. v. Michaelson Properties, 775 F. Supp. 893, 894 (E.D. Va.
1991).
226. Id. at 896 n.3.
227. 360 S.E.2d 828 (Va. 1987).
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dence that some person dominated or controlled the corporation and also
used it to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud, or conceal crime before the
court will disregard the corporate form. 22 Domination or control alone is
not enough. It characterized the decision in Cheatle to uphold the corporate
entity as an example of the stringency of the Virginia standard. The
Michaelson court contrasted this strict standard from the case law to what
it characterized as the "soggy" jury instructions used in the district court.
Those instructions, which allowed the jury to pierce the corporate veil if
it found an "injustice or fundamental unfairness," were not a correct
statement of the Virginia law that requires proof of some legal wrong.
The Michaelson court was careful to distinguish its application of the
"injustice or fundamental unfairness" standard in DeWitt Truck Brokers,
Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,229 a case cited by PRES, noting that
case did not involve Virginia law.
2 0
The Michaelson court determined that there was insufficient evidence
under the Virginia standard to justify remanding the case for a new trial.
The district court had focused on the first part of the Cheatle test involving
control of the corporation and had ignored the second half, which requires
use of the corporate form to disguise a wrong, obscure fraud, or conceal
crime. In reviewing the business relationship between PRES and MPI for
evidence of fraud or crime, the Michaelson court noted that PRES had
full knowledge of Michaelson's sole ownership of and limited capital
investment in MPI. The court found it entirely foreseeable that MPI would
distribute its share of the partnership profits to its sole shareholder and
noted that this distribution took place well before the condominium buyers
filed the breach of warranty claims against the partnership.
The Michaelson court also placed great importance on PRES' selective
use of personal guarantees in its business dealings with Michaelson. In
contrast to the loan agreements with PRES and its parent corporation,
the AAA joint venture agreement between PRES and MPI included no
personal guarantees by Michaelson. Because PRES had willingly entered
the agreement with full knowledge of MPI's structure and capitalization,
the court viewed the agreement as a valid contract. It noted that courts
are more reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in contract cases, usually
requiring proof of misrepresentation to the creditor. Because PRES had
failed to prove that Michaelson had misrepresented MPI's structure or
financial condition, there was no justification for disregarding the part-
nership agreement and eliminating Michaelson's contracted for limited
liability.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Perpetual Real Estate v. Michaelson
Properties has several important lessons. First, while the Fourth Circuit
228. See Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply, 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987)
(articulating two part Virginia test for piercing corporate veil).
229. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
230. See DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (applying
South Carolina law in diversity action involving corporate veil piercing claim).
1993]
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is willing to pierce the corporate veil, it will do so sparingly and only
after the district court has expressly applied the factors from DeWitt Truck
Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. Second, the Fourth Circuit appears
to be less deferential to district court decisions in this area than the
"clearly erroneous" standard would suggest. Finally, in diversity actions,
the Fourth Circuit will take great care in applying the applicable state law
rather than its own veil-piercing jurisprudence. Perpetual Real Estate
should resolve any possible confusion about which standard to apply from
the Fourth Circuit's decision in National Carloading Corp. v. Astro Van
Lines.23' A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil in a diversity
action involving Virginia law will have to prove more than just an
"injustice or fundamental unfairness" to satisfy the Fourth Circuit. The
party will need to satisy the Cheatle test by showing that the corporation
was a device or sham used to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud, or conceal
crime.
Bauer v. Sweeny
964 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1992)
It is, well settled that causes of action against directors, officers, and
employees for mismanagement of a bank belong to the bank rather than
the bank's shareholders. 2 2 Should the bank refuse to institute these causes
of action, one or more of the shareholders may bring a derivative action.233
When a bank fails, however, the causes of action against the bank's
management vest with the bank's receiver and may be conveyed or sold
as any other asset. It is when a bank's causes of action are sold that the
propriety of a shareholder derivative suit comes into question.
234
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. American Bank Trust Shares,
Inc. ,235 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consid-
231. 593 F.2d 559, 563 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing to Kentucky, Kansas, and Nebraska case law
in diversity action applying Virginia law and involving judgment against transferee corporation);
see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 705 (2nd Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing Fourth Circuit's decision in National Carloading Corp.).
232. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. American Bank Trust Shares, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 302,
306 (D.S.C. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 558 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1977),
remanded, 460 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.C. 1978), aff'd, 629 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Mid-
State Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that
shareholders do not have standing to assert claims on behalf of corporation); Gaff v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 814 F.2d 311, 315 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that shareholder does not have
personal right of action for wrongs to corporation); United States v. Palmer 578 F.2d 144, 145-
46 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that only corporation can bring action for injury to corporation).
233. See FED R. Civ. P. 23.1 (allowing shareholder derivative actions when corporation or
association has "failed to enforce 'right which may properly be asserted by it").
234. Compare Tucker v. New Orleans Laundries, 145 So. 2d 365, 369 (La. Ct. App. 1962)
(holding that corporation's sale of cause of action precludes shareholder derivative action) with
Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 148 (3rd Cir. 1973) (holding that placing
bank into receivership does not preclude shareholder derivative action).
235. 558 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1977) (affirming that sale of cause of action precludes shareholder
derivative suit when purchaser has brought acion).
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ered a case where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in
its corporate capacity, purchased from the FDIC, as receiver, causes of
action against officers and directors of the bank. The American Bank
court affirmed that this purchase for value precluded a shareholder deriv-
ative action while the FDIC was pursuing the same claims and held that
the FDIC had the sole right to pursue them. By contrast, the Fourth
Circuit held in Womble v. Dixon23 6 that where the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), as receiver, transferred the rights
to the causes of action of a failed savings and loan to the FSLIC in its
corporate capacity, shareholders could maintain a derivative action when
the FSLIC neglected to assert certain of those causes of action. The
distinguishing and controlling factor in these cases was the FSLIC's failure
to bring its claims in Womble and the FDIC's active pursuit of its claims
in American Bank. The opinions in Womble and American Bank, there-
fore, avoided a discussion specifically concerning the impact of the sale
or conveyance of a bank's causes of action on the ability of shareholders
to bring a derivative action. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit had not
determined the importance of this issue when it reviewed the case of Bauer
v. Sweeny237.
In Bauer, the plaintiffs were shareholders of Seabank Federal Savings
Bank (Seabank). In December of 1989, the Office of Thrift Supervision
closed Seabank and appointed the Resolution Trust Company as receiver
of the bank (RTC-Receiver). RTC-Receiver then sold all of Seabank's
claims against its officers to the Resolution Trust Company in its corporate
capacity (RTC-Corporate). Because RTC-Corporate apparently had not
pursued any of these potential claims, the plaintiffs attempted to bring a
derivative action against the various officers and directors of Seabank.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina,
on the authority of American Bank, dismissed the plaintiffs' action for
failure to state a claim. The court found that RTC-Corporate purchased,
and exclusively owned, the claims the plaintiffs sought to bring in their
derivative action. The court held, therefore, that the shareholders lacked
standing to pursue their derivative claims because the sole right to institute
the claims belonged to RTC-Corporate. Plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth
Circuit where the decision of the district court was affirmed.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit echoed
the lower court's reliance on American Bank. However, in so relying on
American Bank, both the Bauer court and the district court were forced
to confront the seemingly contradictory language of the district court in
Womble, affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, which stated that "[a] derivative
action is not precluded simply because a bank, or a savings and loan
236. 752 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that shareholder derivative suit may be proper
where FSLIC neglected to bring cause of action).
237. 964 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1992) (addressing impact of sale of cause of action on shareholder
derivative suit).
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association is placed in receivership. ' 238 The district court held that this
language applies only to situations where a bank still owns the causes of
action the shareholders seek to assert in a derivative action. Thus, the
district court, and the Fourth Circuit on appeal, read Womble as presenting
a situation where the FSLIC-Receiver transferred, but did not sell for
value, the savings and loan's causes of action to FSLIC-Corporate.
The Bauer court's characterization of Womble as a transfer of the
causes of action allowed it to distinguish Womble from the present case
where the receiver sold the causes of action. Moreover, the Bauer court
noted that in Womble the question of whether the sale of a cause of
action precludes a derivative action was not even at issue. In Womble,
the defendants had challenged the shareholders' standing on the grounds
that they failed to demonstrate the FSLIC's refusal to assert certain claims
it properly could have asserted.
Having satisfactorily distinguished Womble, the Bauer court concluded
that, as in American Bank, RTC-Corporate validly purchased the rights
to Seabank's claims. This purchase meant that Seabank's shareholders
lacked standing to bring a derivative action. In so holding, the court
reasoned that a derivative action by the bank's shareholders presupposes
that the bank itself has a cause of action. When Seabank ceased to have
any interest in the causes of action because RTC-Receiver sold those rights,
the sale extinguished the shareholders' derivative action as well. The
rationale for this holding is that Seabank and its shareholders had already
received the benefits of these causes of action as consideration for the
sale. The Bauer court found it reasonable, therefore, that the sale of
Seabank's claims should preclude a derivative action by Seabank's share-
holders.
Chief Judge Ervin filed a dissenting opinion which called into question
the analysis of the majority. The dissent argued that the majority placed
too little weight on the fact that in American Bank the FDIC was pursuing
all potential claims against the bank's officers. According to the dissent,
American Bank stands only for the narrow proposition that shareholders
cannot bring a derivative action when a purchaser of that action is pursuing
the same claim. The dissent concluded that because RTC-Corporate had
not pursued its purchased claims the shareholders could bring their deriv-
ative action.
Chief Judge Ervin strengthened his conclusion that the shareholders
had standing with three additional arguments. First, the dissent argued
that the situation in Bauer is governed by the law of assignment. According
to principles of assignment, Seabank, through its receiver, may sell only
what it owns to RTC-Corporate. Had Seabank retained its causes of action
but refused or failed to pursue them, courts would permit the shareholders
238. Womble v. Dixon, 585 F. Supp. 728, 731 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd in part, 752 F.2d 80
(4th Cir. 1984).
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to bring a derivative action. Likewise, the dissent concluded, the rights
that RTC-Corporate had purchased were subject to the same limitation
allowing the shareholders to bring a derivative action should RTC-Cor-
porate fail to assert those rights.
The second argument advanced by Chief Judge Ervin concerned the
terms of the sale of Seabank's claims. Under these terms, Seabank was
to receive the excess over a certain figure of any recovery resulting from
a successful claim against the bank's officers. The dissent argued that this
provision was a significant part of the bargain, and, unless the claims are
brought, Seabank and its shareholders will not realize the value of this
provision of the sale.
Finally, the dissent noted that the decision to sell the bank's causes
of action was within the discretion of the bank's management. Further-
more, the management of a bank usually is the target of a shareholder
derivative action. The dissent found a conflict of interest in allowing a
bank's management to avoid derivative actions, and therefore their own
liability, by selling the bank's causes of action to a third party. The
dissent argued that this power effectively would defeat the purpose of the
shareholder derivative action. For these reasons, the dissent concluded
that the circuit court should reverse the decision of the district court.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Bauer is significant in that it resolves
a question that American Bank and Womble left unanswered. From
American Bank, it is clear that a shareholder derivative suit is precluded
when the holder of the claims both purchased those claims for value and
is presently pursuing those claims. 2 9 Alternatively, Womble suggests that
if the holder of the causes of action did not purchase them for value and
is not actively pursuing those rights, a shareholder may properly institute
a derivative action. While American Bank and Womble effectively define
certain conditions that block derivative actions, neither court spoke directly
to the situation, as in Bauer, where a third party purchases the bank's
causes of action for value, but never pursues those rights. In deciding
Bauer, the Fourth Circuit made clear that the purchase of claims for value
is controlling. Once a corporation, or its receiver sells its causes of action,
the shareholders may not bring a 'derivative suit. The usual question in a
derivative suit, whether the corporation has failed or refused to bring the
action on its own,24 ' is irrelevant once the bank sells its causes of action
for value.
239. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. American Bank Shares, Inc., 558 F.2d 711, 714 (4th
Cir. 1977) (holding that district court did not err in determining that FDIC-Corporate had sole
right to pursue action against bank's officers).
240. See Womble v. Dixon, 752 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that refusal of FSLIC
to bring claims may permit shareholder derivative suit).
241. See FED R. Civ. P. 23.1 (permitting derivative actions by shareholders only when
corporation has failed to pursue claim).
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United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Allied Towing Corp.
966 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1992)
The corporate veil provides only limited protection against liability for
the corporation's wrongs. A variety of conditions have led courts to pierce
the corporate veil. Some of these conditions include failure to observe
corporate formalities, to maintain corporate records, to pay dividends, or
to provide a corporation with sufficient capital.242 Courts consistently have
refused, however, to pierce the veil between two corporations merely
because the businesses have the same officers or directors. 243 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached this same conclu-
sion in United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Allied Towing Corp.2
44
Allied Towing was an admiralty case arising out of a collision involving
a tugboat, barge, and Navy ship. On March 24, 1989, the Mount Baker,
a Navy ammunition ship, struck the TMI-96, an unmanned barge owned
by Transerve Marine, Inc. (Transerve). The Starcrescent, a tugboat that
Allied Towing Corp. (Allied) owned, was towing the TMI-96. Both the
barge and the Navy ship suffered damages in the collision.
Transerve and the barge's insurer, United States Fire Insurance Co.
(U.S. Fire), filed suit against Allied and the Navy. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found both Allied and
the Navy at fault and apportioned liability equally between them. The
district court awarded U.S. Fire and Transerve damages, but the court
refused to award the plaintiffs prejudgment interest. U.S. Fire and Tran-
serve appealed, seeking prejudgment interest. Allied and the Navy cross-
appealed, questioning the district court's liability apportionment, findings
of fault, and damages award.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit left intact the district court's appor-
tionment of liability and findings of fault. However, the Fourth Circuit
242. See Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989) (listing conditions or
actions that may support piercing corporate veil, including grossly undercapitalizing corporation,
failing to observe corporate formalities, siphoning funds from corporation, failing to pay
dividends, and lacking corporate records); see also United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768
F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that limitation on owner liability for corporation's wrongs
may not apply if owner established corporation for fraudulent purpose, used corporation to
commit illegal act, or drained corporation's assets), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1041 (1986); cf. United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (Ist Cir. 1990) (finding that parent corporation,
which asserted total control over subsidiary's activities, could be liable for subsidiary's violations
of federal environmental laws), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
243. See, e.g., Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uruvan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1263
(10th Cir. 1989) (stating that identity of corporate officers and directors does not justify piercing
corporate veil); Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d at 691 (concluding that 100 percent ownership and
identity of corporate officers and directors are, even together, insufficient basis for piercing
corporate veil); C.M. Corp. v. Oberer Dev. Co., 631 F.2d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that
stock control and common officers and directors are generally prerequisite to piercing corporate
veil, but that those factors are not sufficient by themselves).
244. 966 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1992).
CASE COMMENTS
was not satisfied with the district court's explanation of the damages
award. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dam-
ages findings and remanded the case for a more detailed explanation of
the basis for the award.
The Fourth Circuit next considered the district court's denial of
prejudgment interest. Citing Reeled Tubing, Inc. v. M/V Chad G,245 the
court stated that awarding prejudgment interest in maritime cases is the
rule rather than the exception. In practice, the Fourth Circuit noted, such
an award is virtually automatic. However, the court recognized that a
district court has authority to deny prejudgment interest if "peculiar
circumstances" would render such an award inequitable. 246 Examples of
such circumstances include an unwarranted delay in bringing a lawsuit, a
damages award substantially less than that sought, a genuine dispute
regarding liability, complex legal and factual issues, and a bad faith claim.
The Fourth Circuit determined that the case before it did not present
peculiar circumstances. The district court had declined to award prejudg-
ment interest because it determined that Transerve was partially responsible
for the collision. Specifically, the district court imputed partial fault to
Transerve because its officers and directors, acting as Allied's officers and
directors, decided not to repair a winch on the Starcrescent until the tug
and tow reached Virginia. The failure to make such repairs meant the
barge's tow line was longer than advisable, and this apparently contributed
to the collision.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Transerve and
Allied had effectively identical ownership, boards, and management. Mak-
ing such similarities the basis for finding Transerve at fault, however,
required piercing Transerve's corporate veil. Consequently, the central
question before the Fourth Circuit was whether piercing Transerve's veil
was appropriate.
The court first noted that certain situations-including failure to
observe corporate formalities, to maintain corporate records, or to capi-
talize a corporation sufficiently-can support piercing the corporate veil.
But merely sharing officers and directors, the Fourth Circuit found, is
not one of those situations. The Fourth Circuit cited Crown Central
Petroleum Corp. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.,247 in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that sister corpo-
rations are presumably separate despite their common ownership. The
Fourth Circuit also relied on Zaist v. Olson, 248 in which the Supreme
Court of Connecticut recognized that there is nothing inherently "insidi-
ous" about interlocking directorates or identity of officers. Finally, the
Fourth Circuit also cited Washington & Old Dominion Users Ass'n v.
245. 794 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1986).
246. Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990).
247. 602 F.2d 474, 476 (2d Cir. 1979).
248. 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967).
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Washington & Old Dominion Railroad,249 in which the Virginia Supreme
Court held that an intrastate railroad and its parent company were separate
entities, even though the companies shared some officers and directors. 250
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to pierce Transerve's corporate veil elim-
inated the district court's sole reason for denying Transerve prejudgment
interest. Without piercing Transerve's corporate veil, the district court
could not find Transerve at fault for Allied's decision not to repair the
Starcrescent's winch. Without that finding of fault, there was no reason
to deny Transerve's motion for prejudgment interest. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling on that motion.
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to pierce the corporate veil merely because
Transerve and Allied shared officers and directors is in accord with cases
from other jurisdictions. For example, in McKinney v. Gannett Co.,251 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying New
Mexico law, noted that courts generally will recognize the separate status
of a parent corporation and its subsidiary, even if the parent owns all
shares in the subsidiary and the corporations share officers and directors.
252
Similarly, in Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uruvan, Inc. ,253 the
Tenth Circuit, this time applying Colorado law, stated that identity of
corporate officers and directors does not justify piercing the corporate
veil. 2
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Likewise, in United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. ,255 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, con-
cluded that one hundred percent ownership of one corporation by another
and identity of corporate officers and directors are, even together, an
insufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil. 256 Finally, in C.M. Corp.
v. Oberer Development Co.,257 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit stated that stock control and common officers and direc-
tors are generally prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil, but that those
factors are not sufficient by themselves.
258
249. 155 S.E.2d 322, 325-26 (Va. 1967).
250. The companies maintained separate corporate books and accounting records. Washing-
ton & Old Dominion Users Ass'n v. Washington & Old Dominion R.R., 155 S.E.2d 322, 325
(Va. 1967). Separate labor agreements covered each company's employees. Id. The railroad
systems were not physically connected, and each railroad maintained its own published tariffs.
Id. Furthermore, although the companies shared some officers and directors, the same persons
did not hold precisely the same positions in both railroads. Id.
251. 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
252. McKinney v. Gannett Co., 817 F.2d 659, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1987).
253. 878 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1989).
254. Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uruvan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir.
1989).
255. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1041 (1986).
256. United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1041 (1986).
257. 631 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1980).
258. C.M. Corp. v. Oberer Dev. Co., 631 F.2d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1980).
